Quantum key distribution has emerged as a promising solution for constructing secure communication networks, offering information-theoretic security guaranteed by the principles of quantum mechanics. One of the most advanced quantum key distribution protocols to date is the phase-matching protocol. Its security was initially established using an abstract method known as symmetry-protected privacy. In this study, we reevaluate the security of the phase-matching protocol using an intuitive source-replacement model, and we arrive at conclusions that align with the original proof. This model provides a fresh perspective on the protocol's security. As an application of this approach, we introduce a beam-splitting attack scheme. Leveraging the source-replacement model, we derive a lower bound on the phase error rate under this attack, further underscoring the robustness of our security analysis method.
@article{arxiv.2309.17304,
title = {Source-Replacement Model for Phase-Matching Quantum Key Distribution},
author = {Yizhi Huang and Zhenyu Du and Xiongfeng Ma},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.17304},
year = {2024}
}