Threat modeling for cyber-physical systems (CPS) remains a largely manual exercise. This project presents SMSI (System Model Security Inference), a hybrid neuro-symbolic pipeline that starts from a SysML architecture model and produces a prioritized list of NIST 800-53 security controls. The prototype has three main stages: a deterministic parser mapping system components to vulnerabilities via the NVD; a family of retrieval and classification models linking vulnerabilities to MITRE ATT&CK techniques; and a control recommender. We explore three approaches for CVE-to-ATT&CK mapping: a supervised classifier using fine-tuned SecureBERT+, retrieval-based dense encoders, and a zero-shot LLM approach using Gemma-4 26B. We validate the pipeline on a healthcare IoT gateway with nine software components. For the ATT&CK-to-NIST stage, pretrained SecureBERT achieves the highest control retrieval scores, demonstrating that dense embeddings provide a strong basis for automated control recommendation.
@article{arxiv.2604.23905,
title = {SMSI: System Model Security Inference: Automated Threat Modeling for Cyber-Physical Systems},
author = {RoÝah Radaideh and Ali Khreis},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.23905},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
9 pages, 8 figures, 7 tables. University of Ottawa for ELG5271/CSI5388