Sketching a Model on Fisheries Enforcement and Compliance -- A Survey
General Economics
2023-06-30 v1 Optimization and Control
Probability
Economics
Abstract
Monitoring and enforcement considerations have been largely forgotten in the study of fishery management. This paper discusses this issue through a model formalization to show the impacts of costly, imperfect enforcement of law on the behavior of fishing firms and fisheries management. Theoretical analysis merges a standard bio-economic model of fisheries (Gordon-Schaefer) with Becker theory of Crime and Punishment.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2306.16960,
title = {Sketching a Model on Fisheries Enforcement and Compliance -- A Survey},
author = {Manuel Coelho and José António Filipe and Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.16960},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
9 pages and no figures