English

SIR-Bench: Evaluating Investigation Depth in Security Incident Response Agents

Cryptography and Security 2026-04-15 v1 Artificial Intelligence Software Engineering

Abstract

We present SIR-Bench, a benchmark of 794 test cases for evaluating autonomous security incident response agents that distinguishes genuine forensic investigation from alert parroting. Derived from 129 anonymized incident patterns with expert-validated ground truth, SIR-Bench measures not only whether agents reach correct triage decisions, but whether they discover novel evidence through active investigation. To construct SIR-Bench, we develop Once Upon A Threat (OUAT), a framework that replays real incident patterns in controlled cloud environments, producing authentic telemetry with measurable investigation outcomes. Our evaluation methodology introduces three complementary metrics: triage accuracy (M1), novel finding discovery (M2), and tool usage appropriateness (M3), assessed through an adversarial LLM-as-Judge that inverts the burden of proof -- requiring concrete forensic evidence to credit investigations. Evaluating our SIR agent on the benchmark demonstrates 97.1% true positive (TP) detection, 73.4% false positive (FP) rejection, and 5.67 novel key findings per case, establishing a baseline against which future investigation agents can be measured.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2604.12040,
  title  = {SIR-Bench: Evaluating Investigation Depth in Security Incident Response Agents},
  author = {Daniel Begimher and Cristian Leo and Jack Huang and Pat Gaw and Bonan Zheng},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.12040},
  year   = {2026}
}

Comments

9 pages, 6 tables, 1 figure. Equal contribution by first three authors

R2 v1 2026-07-01T12:07:35.285Z