Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting
Computer Science and Game Theory
2023-09-07 v2
Abstract
We introduce an end-to-end model of participatory budgeting grounded in social choice theory. This model accounts for both the first stage, in which participants propose projects to be shortlisted, and the second stage, in which they vote on which of the shortlisted projects should be funded. We introduce several shortlisting rules for the first stage and we analyse them in both normative and algorithmic terms. Our main focus is on the incentives of participants to engage in strategic behaviour, especially in the first stage, in which they need to reason about how their proposals will impact the range of strategies available to everyone in the second stage.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2010.10309,
title = {Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting},
author = {Simon Rey and Ulle Endriss and Ronald de Haan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.10309},
year = {2023}
}