In 2022, a prominent supersingular isogeny-based cryptographic scheme, namely SIDH, was compromised by a key recovery attack. However, this attack does not undermine the isogeny path problem, which remains central to the security of isogeny-based cryptography. Following the attacks by Castryck and Decru, as well as Maino and Martindale, Robert gave a mature and polynomial-time algorithm that transforms the SIDH key recovery attack into a valuable cryptographic tool. In this paper, we combine this tool with advanced encoding techniques to construct a novel threshold scheme.
@article{arxiv.2411.18844,
title = {Sharing the Path: A Threshold Scheme from Isogenies and Error Correcting Codes},
author = {Mohamadou Sall and M. Anwar Hasan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.18844},
year = {2024}
}