We introduce a model of content moderation for sale, where a platform can channel attention in two ways: direct steering that makes content visible to consumers and certification that controls what consumers know about the content. The platform optimally price discriminates using both instruments. Content from higher willingness-to-pay providers enjoys higher quality certification and more views. The platform cross-subsidizes content: the same certificate is assigned to content from low willingness-to-pay providers that appeals to consumers and content from higher willingness-to-pay providers that does not. Cross-subsidization can benefit consumers by making content more diverse; regulation enforcing accurate certification may be harmful.
@article{arxiv.2506.12604,
title = {Selling Certification, Content Moderation, and Attention},
author = {Heski Bar-Isaac and Rahul Deb and Matthew Mitchell},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.12604},
year = {2025}
}