Segment-Level Coherence for Robust Harmful Intent Probing in LLMs
Abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly exposed to adaptive jailbreaking, particularly in high-stakes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) domains. Although streaming probes enable real-time monitoring, they still make systematic errors. We identify a core issue: existing methods often rely on a few high-scoring tokens, leading to false alarms when sensitive CBRN terms appear in benign contexts. To address this, we introduce a streaming probing objective that requires multiple evidence tokens to consistently support a prediction, rather than relying on isolated spikes. This encourages more robust detection based on aggregated signals instead of single-token cues. At a fixed 1% false-positive rate, our method improves the true-positive rate by 35.55% relative to strong streaming baselines. We further observe substantial gains in AUROC, even when starting from near-saturated baseline performance (AUROC = 97.40%). We also show that probing Attention or MLP activations consistently outperforms residual-stream features. Finally, even when adversarial fine-tuning enables novel character-level ciphers, harmful intent remains detectable: probes developed for the base LLMs can be applied ``plug-and-play'' to these obfuscated attacks, achieving an AUROC of over 98.85%.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2604.14865,
title = {Segment-Level Coherence for Robust Harmful Intent Probing in LLMs},
author = {Xuanli He and Bilgehan Sel and Faizan Ali and Jenny Bao and Hoagy Cunningham and Jerry Wei},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.14865},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
preprint