Security Analysis of Agentic AI Communication Protocols: A Comparative Evaluation
Abstract
Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly foundational to complex, distributed workflows. Yet, the security of their underlying communication protocols remains critically under-examined. This paper presents the first empirical, comparative security analysis of the official CORAL implementation and a high-fidelity, SDK-based ACP implementation, benchmarked against a literature-based evaluation of A2A. Using a 14 point vulnerability taxonomy, we systematically assess their defenses across authentication, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Our results reveal a pronounced security dichotomy: CORAL exhibits a robust architectural design, particularly in its transport-layer message validation and session isolation, but suffers from critical implementation-level vulnerabilities, including authentication and authorization failures at its SSE gateway. Conversely, ACP's architectural flexibility, most notably its optional JWS enforcement, translates into high-impact integrity and confidentiality flaws. We contextualize these findings within current industry trends, highlighting that existing protocols remain insufficiently secure. As a path forward, we recommend a hybrid approach that combines CORAL's integrated architecture with ACP's mandatory per-message integrity guarantees, laying the groundwork for resilient, next-generation agent communications.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2511.03841,
title = {Security Analysis of Agentic AI Communication Protocols: A Comparative Evaluation},
author = {Yedidel Louck and Ariel Stulman and Amit Dvir},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.03841},
year = {2025}
}