Securing Consensus from Long-Range Attacks through Collaboration
Abstract
Decentralized systems built around blockchain technology promise clients an immutable ledger. They add a transaction to the ledger after it undergoes consensus among the replicas that run a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) or Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol. Unfortunately, these protocols face a long-range attack where an adversary having access to the private keys of the replicas can rewrite the ledger. One solution is forcing each committed block from these protocols to undergo another consensus, Proof-of-Work(PoW) consensus; PoW protocol leads to wastage of computational resources as miners compete to solve complex puzzles. In this paper, we present the design of our Power-of-Collaboration (PoC) protocol, which guards existing PoS/BFT blockchains against long-range attacks and requires miners to collaborate rather than compete. PoC guarantees fairness and accountability and only marginally degrades the throughput of the underlying system.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2302.02325,
title = {Securing Consensus from Long-Range Attacks through Collaboration},
author = {Junchao Chen and Suyash Gupta and Alberto Sonnino and Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias and Mohammad Sadoghi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.02325},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
17 pages