English

Robust Restaking Networks

Computer Science and Game Theory 2024-08-01 v1 Data Structures and Algorithms

Abstract

We study the risks of validator reuse across multiple services in a restaking protocol. We characterize the robust security of a restaking network as a function of the buffer between the costs and profits from attacks. For example, our results imply that if attack costs always exceed attack profits by 10\%, then a sudden loss of .1\% of the overall stake (e.g., due to a software error) cannot result in the ultimate loss of more than 1.1\% of the overall stake. We also provide local analogs of these overcollateralization conditions and robust security guarantees that apply specifically for a target service or coalition of services. All of our bounds on worst-case stake loss are the best possible. Finally, we bound the maximum-possible length of a cascade of attacks. Our results suggest measures of robustness that could be exposed to the participants in a restaking protocol. We also suggest polynomial-time computable sufficient conditions that can proxy for these measures.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2407.21785,
  title  = {Robust Restaking Networks},
  author = {Naveen Durvasula and Tim Roughgarden},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21785},
  year   = {2024}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-28T17:59:36.939Z