Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria
Abstract
Equilibria in auctions can be very difficult to analyze, beyond the symmetric environments where revenue equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robust approach to evaluating the equilibria of auctions. Rather than identify the equilibria of an auction under specific environmental conditions, it considers worst-case analysis, where an auction is evaluated according to the worst environment and worst equilibrium in that environment. It identifies a non-equilibrium property of auctions that governs whether or not their worst-case equilibria are good for welfare and revenue. This property is easy to analyze, can be refined from data, and composes across markets where multiple auctions are run simultaneously.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2310.03702,
title = {Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria},
author = {Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy and Samuel Taggart},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.03702},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
This paper provides an economic interpretation on results presented in an extended abstract under the title "Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue" at the fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation