Revisiting the security of quantum dialogue and bidirectional quantum secure direct communication
Abstract
From the perspective of information theory and cryptography, we analyze the security of two quantum dialogue protocols and a bidirectional quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol, and point out that the transmitted information would be partly leaked out in them. That is, any eavesdropper can elicit some information about the secrets from the public annunciations of the legal users. This phenomenon should have been strictly forbidden in a quantum secure communication. In fact, this problem exists in quite a few recent proposals and, therefore, it deserves more research attention in the following related study.
Cite
@article{arxiv.0801.2420,
title = {Revisiting the security of quantum dialogue and bidirectional quantum secure direct communication},
author = {Fei Gao and Fen-Zhuo Guo and Qiao-Yan Wen and Fu-Chen Zhu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0801.2420},
year = {2008}
}
Comments
An authors' note was added. That is, when this study was completed, we found that the insecurity of quantum dialogue was independently pointed out by Tan and Cai (see arXiv:0802.0358)