Quantity of Matter or Intrinsic Property: Why Mass Cannot Be Both
Abstract
I analyze the meaning of mass in Newtonian mechanics. First, I explain the notion of primitive ontology, which was originally introduced in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Then I examine the two common interpretations of mass: mass as a measure of the quantity of matter and mass as a dynamical property. I claim that the former is ill-defined, and the latter is only plausible with respect to a metaphysical interpretation of laws of nature. I explore the following options for the status of laws: Humeanism, primitivism about laws, dispositionalism, and ontic structural realism.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1512.03295,
title = {Quantity of Matter or Intrinsic Property: Why Mass Cannot Be Both},
author = {Mario Hubert},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.03295},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
Forthcoming in Felline, L., Paoli, F., Rossanese, E., editors, New Developments in Logic and Philosophy of Science, London: College Publications. (Proceedings of the Triennial International Conference of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Sciences, Rome, Italy, 2014.)