Publicly Understandable Electronic Voting: A Non-Cryptographic, End-to-End Verifiable Scheme
Abstract
Modern democracies face an existential crisis of waning public trust in election results. While End-to-End Verifiable (E2E-V) voting systems promise mathematically secure elections, their reliance on complex cryptography creates a ``black box'' that forces blind trust in opaque software or external experts, ultimately failing to build genuine public confidence. To solve this, we introduce the concept of Software-Free Verification (SFV) -- a standard requiring that voters can independently verify election integrity without relying on any software. We propose a practical, non-cryptographic in-booth voting scheme that achieves SFV for national-scale elections. Our approach leverages a public bulletin board of randomized (Pseudonym, Candidate) pairs, where a mechanically generated pseudonym is hidden among real decoy votes on a physical receipt. Our scheme empowers citizens to audit the election using only basic arithmetic via a hierarchical Public Ledger, while anchoring the overall digital tally to physical evidence and Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) to guarantee systemic integrity. The result is a system that bridges the gap between mathematical security and public transparency, offering a viable blueprint for restoring trust in democratic infrastructure.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2603.21833,
title = {Publicly Understandable Electronic Voting: A Non-Cryptographic, End-to-End Verifiable Scheme},
author = {Alon Gat},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.21833},
year = {2026}
}