Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms
Computer Science and Game Theory
2017-11-23 v1
Abstract
Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these axioms by identifying budgets that are representative to the demands of vast segments of the voters.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1711.08226,
title = {Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms},
author = {Haris Aziz and Barton Lee and Nimrod Talmon},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.08226},
year = {2017}
}