English

Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents

Data Structures and Algorithms 2018-04-11 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory

Abstract

We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] completion times. This is the first prompt online algorithm for the problem. When such jobs are strategic agents, delaying scheduling decisions makes little sense. Moreover, the mechanism has a particularly simple form of an anonymous menu of options.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1804.03244,
  title  = {Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents},
  author = {Alon Eden and Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat and Tzahi Taub},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.03244},
  year   = {2018}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-23T01:18:37.038Z