Preventing EFail Attacks with Client-Side WebAssembly: The Case of Swiss Post's IncaMail
Abstract
Traditional email encryption schemes are vulnerable to EFail attacks, which exploit the lack of message authentication by manipulating ciphertexts and exfiltrating plaintext via HTML backchannels. Swiss Post's IncaMail, a secure email service for transmitting legally binding, encrypted, and verifiable emails, counters EFail attacks using an authenticated-encryption with associated data (AEAD) encryption scheme to ensure message privacy and authentication between servers. IncaMail relies on a trusted infrastructure backend and encrypts messages per user policy. This paper presents a revised IncaMail architecture that offloads the majority of cryptographic operations to clients, offering benefits such as reduced computational load and energy footprint, relaxed trust assumptions, and per-message encryption key policies. Our proof-of-concept prototype and benchmarks demonstrate the robustness of the proposed scheme, with client-side WebAssembly-based cryptographic operations yielding significant performance improvements (up to ~14x) over conventional JavaScript implementations.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2306.13388,
title = {Preventing EFail Attacks with Client-Side WebAssembly: The Case of Swiss Post's IncaMail},
author = {Pascal Gerig and Jämes Ménétrey and Baptiste Lanoix and Florian Stoller and Pascal Felber and Marcelo Pasin and Valerio Schiavoni},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.13388},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
This publication incorporates results from the VEDLIoT project, which received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 957197