Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
General Economics
2021-02-15 v2 Economics
Abstract
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2102.04337,
title = {Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching},
author = {Federico Echenique and Alfred Galichon},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.04337},
year = {2021}
}
Comments
29 pages, 2 figures