English

Optimal Questionnaires for Screening of Strategic Agents

Information Retrieval 2020-10-29 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control

Abstract

During the COVID-1919 pandemic the health authorities at airports and train stations try to screen and identify the travellers possibly exposed to the virus. However, many individuals avoid getting tested and hence may misreport their travel history. This is a challenge for the health authorities who wish to ascertain the truly susceptible cases in spite of this strategic misreporting. We investigate the problem of questioning travellers to classify them for further testing when the travellers are strategic or are unwilling to reveal their travel histories. We show there are fundamental limits to how many travel histories the health authorities can recover.% can be correctly classified by any probing mechanism.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2010.15008,
  title  = {Optimal Questionnaires for Screening of Strategic Agents},
  author = {Anuj S. Vora and Ankur A. Kulkarni},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.15008},
  year   = {2020}
}

Comments

Longer version of our paper submitted to ICASSP 2021