On Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics
Abstract
Mathematics cannot anymore be assimilated to a linguistic game, where formal proofs are strongly differentiated with conjectural thinking, without building any category of knowledge to understand the passage (Wittgenstein's gist). Nowadays, philosophy has to face with the growing, exponential ramified tree of speculative mathematical thinking. Our main (problematical) theses are: 1. In mathematics, there is no empirical automatism, and no separate, physical-like motricity. 2: The irreversible-synthetical must force to complexify the exegetical game of philosophy; numerical experiments in algebra and in number theory are a kind of letting blow up all possible problems; 4. The nature of mathematical questioning still remains in question.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.0801.1066,
title = {On Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics},
author = {Joel Merker},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0801.1066},
year = {2008}
}
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Written in French