On Multi-Level Apportionment
Theoretical Economics
2025-11-14 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of apportionment where the groups form a hierarchical structure, which gives rise to stronger versions of the upper and lower quota notions. We show that running Adams' method level-by-level satisfies upper quota, while running Jefferson's method or the quota method level-by-level guarantees lower quota. Moreover, we prove that both quota notions can always be fulfilled simultaneously.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2511.10000,
title = {On Multi-Level Apportionment},
author = {Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin and Warut Suksompong and Steven Wijaya},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.10000},
year = {2025}
}