English

Note on Attacking Object Detectors with Adversarial Stickers

Cryptography and Security 2018-07-25 v2 Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Machine Learning

Abstract

Deep learning has proven to be a powerful tool for computer vision and has seen widespread adoption for numerous tasks. However, deep learning algorithms are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. These adversarial inputs are created such that, when provided to a deep learning algorithm, they are very likely to be mislabeled. This can be problematic when deep learning is used to assist in safety critical decisions. Recent research has shown that classifiers can be attacked by physical adversarial examples under various physical conditions. Given the fact that state-of-the-art objection detection algorithms are harder to be fooled by the same set of adversarial examples, here we show that these detectors can also be attacked by physical adversarial examples. In this note, we briefly show both static and dynamic test results. We design an algorithm that produces physical adversarial inputs, which can fool the YOLO object detector and can also attack Faster-RCNN with relatively high success rate based on transferability. Furthermore, our algorithm can compress the size of the adversarial inputs to stickers that, when attached to the targeted object, result in the detector either mislabeling or not detecting the object a high percentage of the time. This note provides a small set of results. Our upcoming paper will contain a thorough evaluation on other object detectors, and will present the algorithm.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1712.08062,
  title  = {Note on Attacking Object Detectors with Adversarial Stickers},
  author = {Kevin Eykholt and Ivan Evtimov and Earlence Fernandes and Bo Li and Dawn Song and Tadayoshi Kohno and Amir Rahmati and Atul Prakash and Florian Tramer},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.08062},
  year   = {2018}
}

Comments

Short Note: The full version of this paper was accepted to USENIX WOOT 2018, and is available at arXiv:1807.07769

R2 v1 2026-06-22T23:26:14.510Z