The advent of quantum computing threatens classical public-key cryptography, motivating NIST's adoption of post-quantum schemes such as those based on the Module Learning With Errors (Module-LWE) problem. We present NoMod ML-Attack, a hybrid white-box cryptanalytic method that circumvents the challenge of modeling modular reduction by treating wrap-arounds as statistical corruption and casting secret recovery as robust linear estimation. Our approach combines optimized lattice preprocessing--including reduced-vector saving and algebraic amplification--with robust estimators trained via Tukey's Biweight loss. Experiments show NoMod achieves full recovery of binary secrets for dimension n=350, recovery of sparse binomial secrets for n=256, and successful recovery of sparse secrets in CRYSTALS-Kyber settings with parameters (n,k)=(128,3) and (256,2). We release our implementation in an anonymous repository https://anonymous.4open.science/r/NoMod-3BD4.
@article{arxiv.2510.02162,
title = {NoMod: A Non-modular Attack on Module Learning With Errors},
author = {Cristian Bassotto and Ermes Franch and Marina Krček and Stjepan Picek},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.02162},
year = {2025}
}