Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, especially multi-turn jailbreaks that distribute malicious intent across benign exchanges and bypass alignment mechanisms. Existing approaches often explore the adversarial space poorly, rely on hand-crafted heuristics, or lack systematic query refinement. We present NEXUS (Network Exploration for eXploiting Unsafe Sequences), a modular framework for constructing, refining, and executing optimized multi-turn attacks. NEXUS comprises: (1) ThoughtNet, which hierarchically expands a harmful intent into a structured semantic network of topics, entities, and query chains; (2) a feedback-driven Simulator that iteratively refines and prunes these chains through attacker-victim-judge LLM collaboration using harmfulness and semantic-similarity benchmarks; and (3) a Network Traverser that adaptively navigates the refined query space for real-time attacks. This pipeline uncovers stealthy, high-success adversarial paths across LLMs. On several closed-source and open-source LLMs, NEXUS increases attack success rate by 2.1% to 19.4% over prior methods. Code: https://github.com/inspire-lab/NEXUS
@article{arxiv.2510.03417,
title = {NEXUS: Network Exploration for eXploiting Unsafe Sequences in Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks},
author = {Javad Rafiei Asl and Sidhant Narula and Mohammad Ghasemigol and Eduardo Blanco and Daniel Takabi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.03417},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
This paper has been accepted in the main conference proceedings of the 2025 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP 2025). Javad Rafiei Asl and Sidhant Narula are co-first authors