Medical Bill Shock and Imperfect Moral Hazard
Abstract
Consumers are sensitive to medical prices when consuming care, but delays in price information may distort moral hazard. We study how medical bills affect household spillover spending following utilization, leveraging variation in insurer claim processing times. Households increase spending by 22\% after a scheduled service, but then reduce spending by 11\% after the bill arrives. Observed bill effects are consistent with resolving price uncertainty; bill effects are strongest when pricing information is particularly salient. A model of demand for healthcare with delayed pricing information suggests households misperceive pricing signals prior to bills, and that correcting these perceptions reduce average (median) spending by 16\% (7\%) annually.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2211.01116,
title = {Medical Bill Shock and Imperfect Moral Hazard},
author = {Alex Hoagland and David M. Anderson and Ed Zhu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.01116},
year = {2024}
}