The prevalence of Internet censorship has prompted the creation of several measurement platforms for monitoring filtering activities. An important challenge faced by these platforms revolves around the trade-off between depth of measurement and breadth of coverage. In this paper, we present an opportunistic censorship measurement infrastructure built on top of a network of distributed VPN servers run by volunteers, which we used to measure the extent to which the I2P anonymity network is blocked around the world. This infrastructure provides us with not only numerous and geographically diverse vantage points, but also the ability to conduct in-depth measurements across all levels of the network stack. Using this infrastructure, we measured at a global scale the availability of four different I2P services: the official homepage, its mirror site, reseed servers, and active relays in the network. Within a period of one month, we conducted a total of 54K measurements from 1.7K network locations in 164 countries. With different techniques for detecting domain name blocking, network packet injection, and block pages, we discovered I2P censorship in five countries: China, Iran, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. Finally, we conclude by discussing potential approaches to circumvent censorship on I2P.
@article{arxiv.1907.07120,
title = {Measuring I2P Censorship at a Global Scale},
author = {Nguyen Phong Hoang and Sadie Doreen and Michalis Polychronakis},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.07120},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
To appear in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI '19). San Francisco, CA. May 2020