Maximum-Likelihood Power-Distortion Monitoring for GNSS Signal Authentication
Abstract
We propose an extension to the so-called PD detector. The PD detector jointly monitors received power and correlation profile distortion to detect the presence of GNSS carry-off-type spoofing, jamming, or multipath. We show that classification performance can be significantly improved by replacing the PD detector's symmetric-difference-based distortion measurement with one based on the post-fit residuals of the maximum-likelihood estimate of a single-signal correlation function model. We call the improved technique the PD-ML detector. In direct comparison with the PD detector, the PD-ML detector exhibits improved classification accuracy when tested against an extensive library of recorded field data. In particular, it is (1) significantly more accurate at distinguishing a spoofing attack from a jamming attack, (2) better at distinguishing multipath-afflicted data from interference-free data, and (3) less likely to issue a false alarm by classifying multipath as spoofing. The PD-ML detector achieves this improved performance at the expense of additional computational complexity.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1712.04501,
title = {Maximum-Likelihood Power-Distortion Monitoring for GNSS Signal Authentication},
author = {Jason N. Gross and Cagri Kilic and Todd E. Humphreys},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.04501},
year = {2018}
}