The integration of large language models (LLMs) into healthcare IoT systems promises faster decisions and improved medical support. LLMs are also deployed as multi-agent teams to assist AI doctors by debating, voting, or advising on decisions. However, when multiple assistant agents interact, coordinated adversaries can collude to create false consensus, pushing an AI doctor toward harmful prescriptions. We develop an experimental framework with scripted and unscripted doctor agents, adversarial assistants, and a verifier agent that checks decisions against clinical guidelines. Using 50 representative clinical questions, we find that collusion drives the Attack Success Rate (ASR) and Harmful Recommendation Rates (HRR) up to 100% in unprotected systems. In contrast, the verifier agent restores 100% accuracy by blocking adversarial consensus. This work provides the first systematic evidence of collusion risk in AI healthcare and demonstrates a practical, lightweight defence that ensures guideline fidelity.
@article{arxiv.2512.03097,
title = {Many-to-One Adversarial Consensus: Exposing Multi-Agent Collusion Risks in AI-Based Healthcare},
author = {Adeela Bashir and The Anh han and Zia Ush Shamszaman},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2512.03097},
year = {2025}
}