Likelihood scoring for continuations of mathematical text: a self-supervised benchmark with tests for shortcut vulnerabilities
Abstract
We introduce an automatically generated benchmark for predicting hidden text in technical papers. A paper supplies visible context and a hidden continuation ; the evaluated model writes an auxiliary forecast string , and a separate scorer assigns next-token probability to both with and without conditioning on . This gives a label-free test of whether transmits information about the continuation, compared against controls where is recent context rather than a forecast. Our main testbed is equation-suffix prediction: the predictor sees context and the first part of a displayed equation, then forecasts the rest. The task mixes surface-level arXiv/TeX text modeling with reasoning-sensitive inference; the suffix is one of many roughly equivalent continuations, so the benchmark is read statistically rather than item-by-item. On 1363 equation continuations from 138 recent physics and mathematics papers, forecasts from GPT-5.5, Opus 4.7, and GPT-5.4 nano all improve clipped likelihood over the context control under both Qwen3-8B and Kimi K2.6 scorers, distinguishing model families and reasoning-effort settings without human labels. To emulate shortcuts where further primes the scorer rather than making a useful forecast, we also fine-tune the scorer on context-only prompts and apply it to held-out papers as a stronger control. GPT-5.5 forecasts still beat this fine-tuned control; GPT-5.4 nano forecasts do not. Longer prose/TeX continuations show positive but noisier lift over controls, concentrated near the beginning of the target. These results support cross-model likelihood scoring as a static benchmark and as a setup for probing shortcut vulnerabilities before reinforcement learning or model-selection optimization is applied.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2605.10810,
title = {Likelihood scoring for continuations of mathematical text: a self-supervised benchmark with tests for shortcut vulnerabilities},
author = {Daniel Ranard},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.10810},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
13 pages + appendices, 4 figures; v2: expanded related work