Intuitive psychology is a pillar of common-sense reasoning. The replication of this reasoning in machine intelligence is an important stepping-stone on the way to human-like artificial intelligence. Several recent tasks and benchmarks for examining this reasoning in Large-Large Models have focused in particular on belief attribution in Theory-of-Mind tasks. These tasks have shown both successes and failures. We consider in particular a recent purported success case, and show that small variations that maintain the principles of ToM turn the results on their head. We argue that in general, the zero-hypothesis for model evaluation in intuitive psychology should be skeptical, and that outlying failure cases should outweigh average success rates. We also consider what possible future successes on Theory-of-Mind tasks by more powerful LLMs would mean for ToM tasks with people.
@article{arxiv.2302.08399,
title = {Large Language Models Fail on Trivial Alterations to Theory-of-Mind Tasks},
author = {Tomer Ullman},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.08399},
year = {2023}
}