Integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) systems traditionally presuppose that sensing and communication (S&C) channels remain approximately constant during their coherence time. However, a "DISCO" reconfigurable intelligent surface (DRIS), i.e., an illegitimate RIS with random, time-varying reflection properties that acts like a "disco ball," introduces a paradigm shift that enables active channel aging more rapidly during the channel coherence time. In this letter, we investigate the impact of DISCO jamming attacks launched by a DRISbased fully-passive jammer (FPJ) on an ISAC system. Specifically, an ISAC problem formulation and a corresponding waveform optimization are presented in which the ISAC waveform design considers the trade-off between the S&C performance and is formulated as a Pareto optimization problem. Moreover, a theoretical analysis is conducted to quantify the impact of DISCO jamming attacks. Numerical results are presented to evaluate the S&C performance under DISCO jamming attacks and to validate the derived theoretical analysis.
@article{arxiv.2404.07477,
title = {Integrated Sensing and Communication Under DISCO Physical-Layer Jamming Attacks},
author = {Huan Huang and Hongliang Zhang and Weidong Mei and Jun Li and Yi Cai and A. Lee Swindlehurst and Zhu Han},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.07477},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
This paper has been submitted for possible publication. For the code of the DISCO RIS is available on Github (https://github.com/huanhuan1799/Disco-Intelligent-Reflecting-Surfaces-Active-Channel-Aging-for-Fully-Passive-Jamming-Attacks)