English

Information Design with Unknown Prior

Computer Science and Game Theory 2025-10-01 v4 Data Structures and Algorithms Machine Learning Theoretical Economics

Abstract

Information designers, such as online platforms, often do not know the beliefs of their receivers. We design learning algorithms so that the information designer can learn the receivers' prior belief from their actions through repeated interactions. Our learning algorithms achieve no regret relative to the optimality for the known prior at a fast speed, achieving a tight regret bound Θ(logT)\Theta(\log T) in general and a tight regret bound Θ(loglogT)\Theta(\log \log T) in the important special case of binary actions.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2410.05533,
  title  = {Information Design with Unknown Prior},
  author = {Ce Li and Tao Lin},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.05533},
  year   = {2025}
}

Comments

A preliminary version of this work was published as an extended abstract at ITCS (Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science) 2025

R2 v1 2026-06-28T19:12:13.057Z