Information Design with Unknown Prior
Computer Science and Game Theory
2025-10-01 v4 Data Structures and Algorithms
Machine Learning
Theoretical Economics
Abstract
Information designers, such as online platforms, often do not know the beliefs of their receivers. We design learning algorithms so that the information designer can learn the receivers' prior belief from their actions through repeated interactions. Our learning algorithms achieve no regret relative to the optimality for the known prior at a fast speed, achieving a tight regret bound in general and a tight regret bound in the important special case of binary actions.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2410.05533,
title = {Information Design with Unknown Prior},
author = {Ce Li and Tao Lin},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.05533},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
A preliminary version of this work was published as an extended abstract at ITCS (Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science) 2025