GNSS Jamming and Spoofing Monitoring Using Low-Cost COTS Receivers
Abstract
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is increasingly vulnerable to radio frequency interference (RFI), including jamming and spoofing, which threaten the integrity of navigation and timing services. This paper presents a methodology for detecting and classifying RFI events using low-cost commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) GNSS receivers. By combining carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N0) measurements with a calibrated received power metric, a two-dimensional detection space is constructed to identify and distinguish nominal, jammed, spoofed, and blocked signal conditions. The method is validated through both controlled jamming tests in Norway and real-world deployments in Poland, and the Southeast Mediterranean which have experienced such conditions. Results demonstrate that COTS-based detection, when properly calibrated, offers a viable and effective approach for GNSS RFI monitoring.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2509.13600,
title = {GNSS Jamming and Spoofing Monitoring Using Low-Cost COTS Receivers},
author = {Argyris Kriezis and Yu-Hsuan Chen and Dennis Akos and Sherman Lo and Todd Walter},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2509.13600},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
Submitted to ION NAVIGATION Journal