English

Gargoyle: A Network-based Insider Attack Resilient Framework for Organizations

Cryptography and Security 2018-07-10 v1 Networking and Internet Architecture

Abstract

`Anytime, Anywhere' data access model has become a widespread IT policy in organizations making insider attacks even more complicated to model, predict and deter. Here, we propose Gargoyle, a network-based insider attack resilient framework against the most complex insider threats within a pervasive computing context. Compared to existing solutions, Gargoyle evaluates the trustworthiness of an access request context through a new set of contextual attributes called Network Context Attribute (NCA). NCAs are extracted from the network traffic and include information such as the user's device capabilities, security-level, current and prior interactions with other devices, network connection status, and suspicious online activities. Retrieving such information from the user's device and its integrated sensors are challenging in terms of device performance overheads, sensor costs, availability, reliability and trustworthiness. To address these issues, Gargoyle leverages the capabilities of Software-Defined Network (SDN) for both policy enforcement and implementation. In fact, Gargoyle's SDN App can interact with the network controller to create a `defence-in-depth' protection system. For instance, Gargoyle can automatically quarantine a suspicious data requestor in the enterprise network for further investigation or filter out an access request before engaging a data provider. Finally, instead of employing simplistic binary rules in access authorizations, Gargoyle incorporates Function-based Access Control (FBAC) and supports the customization of access policies into a set of functions (e.g., disabling copy, allowing print) depending on the perceived trustworthiness of the context.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1807.02593,
  title  = {Gargoyle: A Network-based Insider Attack Resilient Framework for Organizations},
  author = {Arash Shaghaghi and Salil S. Kanhere and Mohamed Ali Kaafar and Elisa Bertino and Sanjay Jha},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.02593},
  year   = {2018}
}

Comments

Accepted to IEEE LCN 2018 as full paper, Pre-final version - slightly different than the final version published by the conference

R2 v1 2026-06-23T02:53:25.975Z