This paper formalizes the proves the security of the Bridgeless protocol, a protocol able to bridge tokens between various chains. The Bridgeless protocol is run by a set of validators, responsible for verifying deposit transactions on the source chain and generating the corresponding withdrawals on the target chain. The protocol is designed to be chain-agnostic and the validators interact with each supported chain via a chain client. It currently supports EVM-compatible chains, the Zano, and the Bitcoin chains. The paper formalizes all involved subprotocols and describes the conditions under which the protocol maintains safety and liveness.
@article{arxiv.2506.19730,
title = {Formalization and security analysis of the Bridgeless protocol},
author = {Orestis Alpos and Oleg Fomenko and Dimitris Karakostas and Oleksandr Kurbatov and Andrey Sabelnikov},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.19730},
year = {2025}
}