Formal Verification of PLCs as a Service: A CERN-GSI Safety-Critical Case Study (extended version)
Abstract
The increased technological complexity and demand for software reliability require organizations to formally design and verify their safety-critical programs to minimize systematic failures. Formal methods are recommended by functional safety standards (e.g., by IEC 61511 for the process industry and by the generic IEC 61508) and play a crucial role. Their structured approach reduces ambiguity in system requirements, facilitating early error detection. This paper introduces a formal verification service for PLC (programmable logic controller) programs compliant with functional safety standards, providing external expertise to organizations while eliminating the need for extensive internal training. It offers a cost-effective solution to meet the rising demands for formal verification processes. The approach is extended to include modeling time-dependent, know-how-protected components, enabling formal verification of real safety-critical applications. A case study shows the application of PLC formal verification as a service provided by CERN in a safety-critical installation at the GSI particle accelerator facility.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2502.19150,
title = {Formal Verification of PLCs as a Service: A CERN-GSI Safety-Critical Case Study (extended version)},
author = {Ignacio D. Lopez-Miguel and Borja Fernández Adiego and Matias Salinas and Christine Betz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.19150},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
Extended version of NFM 2025 paper