English

FaRAccel: FPGA-Accelerated Defense Architecture for Efficient Bit-Flip Attack Resilience in Transformer Models

Cryptography and Security 2025-10-30 v1 Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

Forget and Rewire (FaR) methodology has demonstrated strong resilience against Bit-Flip Attacks (BFAs) on Transformer-based models by obfuscating critical parameters through dynamic rewiring of linear layers. However, the application of FaR introduces non-negligible performance and memory overheads, primarily due to the runtime modification of activation pathways and the lack of hardware-level optimization. To overcome these limitations, we propose FaRAccel, a novel hardware accelerator architecture implemented on FPGA, specifically designed to offload and optimize FaR operations. FaRAccel integrates reconfigurable logic for dynamic activation rerouting, and lightweight storage of rewiring configurations, enabling low-latency inference with minimal energy overhead. We evaluate FaRAccel across a suite of Transformer models and demonstrate substantial reductions in FaR inference latency and improvement in energy efficiency, while maintaining the robustness gains of the original FaR methodology. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first hardware-accelerated defense against BFAs in Transformers, effectively bridging the gap between algorithmic resilience and efficient deployment on real-world AI platforms.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2510.24985,
  title  = {FaRAccel: FPGA-Accelerated Defense Architecture for Efficient Bit-Flip Attack Resilience in Transformer Models},
  author = {Najmeh Nazari and Banafsheh Saber Latibari and Elahe Hosseini and Fatemeh Movafagh and Chongzhou Fang and Hosein Mohammadi Makrani and Kevin Immanuel Gubbi and Abhijit Mahalanobis and Setareh Rafatirad and Hossein Sayadi and Houman Homayoun},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.24985},
  year   = {2025}
}

Comments

Accepted By ICCD 2025

R2 v1 2026-07-01T07:10:39.508Z