Extractive contest design
Theoretical Economics
2022-07-12 v3
Abstract
We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that extract contestants' prize values. In the common-value case, there exists a CSF extractive in any equilibrium. In the observable-private-value case, there exists a CSF extractive in some equilibrium; there exists a CSF extractive in any equilibrium if and only if the number of contestants is greater than or equal to three or the values are homogeneous. In the unobservable-private-value case, there exists no CSF extractive in some equilibrium. When extractive CSFs exist, we explicitly present one of them.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2006.01808,
title = {Extractive contest design},
author = {Tomohiko Kawamori},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.01808},
year = {2022}
}