Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers
General Economics
2020-03-10 v1 Economics
Abstract
Using the Panama Papers, we show that the beginning of media reporting on expropriations and property confiscations in a country increases the probability that offshore entities are incorporated by agents from the same country in the same month. This result is robust to the use of country-year fixed effects and the exclusion of tax havens. Further analysis shows that the effect is driven by countries with non-corrupt and effective governments, which supports the notion that offshore entities are incorporated when reasonably well-intended and well-functioning governments become more serious about fighting organized crime by confiscating proceeds of crime.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1810.09876,
title = {Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers},
author = {Ralph-Christopher Bayer and Roland Hodler and Paul Raschky and Anthony Strittmatter},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.09876},
year = {2020}
}