The vulnerabilities of fingerprint-based recognition systems to direct attacks with and without the cooperation of the user are studied. Two different systems, one minutiae-based and one ridge feature-based, are evaluated on a database of real and fake fingerprints. Based on the fingerprint images quality and on the results achieved on different operational scenarios, we obtain a number of statistically significant observations regarding the robustness of the systems.
@article{arxiv.2212.07575,
title = {Evaluation of direct attacks to fingerprint verification systems},
author = {J. Galbally and J. Fierrez and F. Alonso-Fernandez and M. Martinez-Diaz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.07575},
year = {2022}
}
Comments
Published at Springer Journal of Telecommunication Systems, Special Issue of Biometrics Systems & Applications