Erased but Exploitable: Black-box Embedding-Aware Prompting Against Unlearned Text-to-Image Diffusion Models
Abstract
Machine unlearning aims to remove specific concepts from pretrained text-to-image diffusion models, yet several white- and black-box attacks have been introduced to make the model generate such unlearned concepts. These attacks, nevertheless, do not assume a realistic threat model, i.e. they either assume access to the model weights, or result in gibberish adversarial prompts that could be easily detected even through naive rule-based safeguarding. We aim to address this gap in this paper. We introduce BEAP, a black-box, embedding-aware adversarial prompting attack that leverages a large language model (LLM) to iteratively generate effective adversarial prompts and exploit such hidden vulnerabilities. BEAP performs an embedding-aware search in text space, combining multiple reward signals: unlearned concept presence, text-image alignment, and image quality, to refine generated prompts. Unlike previous attack methods, BEAP keeps its prompts undetectable to safety filters while producing high-quality images. Extensive experiments show that BEAP improves the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by more than 60% over prior methods, while requiring only an average of fifteen prompts per successful attack. Warning: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive or upsetting in nature.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2605.26332,
title = {Erased but Exploitable: Black-box Embedding-Aware Prompting Against Unlearned Text-to-Image Diffusion Models},
author = {Arian Komaei Koma and Seyed Amir Kasaei and AmirMahdi Sadeghzadeh and Mohammad Hossein Rohban},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.26332},
year = {2026}
}