Dysmemic Pressure: Selection Dynamics in Organizational Information Environments

Why do organizations comprised of intelligent individuals converge on collective delusion? This paper introduces dysmemic pressure as a formal mechanism explaining organizational epistemic failure. Synthesizing strategic communication theory (Crawford & Sobel, 1982), agency theory (Prendergast, 1993), and cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), I demonstrate how preference divergence between organizational agents generates stable equilibria where communication becomes statistically independent of reality, while transmission biases lock dysfunction into self-reinforcing states. The mechanism operates through identifiable dynamics: as the bias between sender and receiver preferences increases, communication precision degrades through progressively coarser partitions until reaching "babbling equilibrium" where messages carry no information; simultaneously, transmission biases (content, prestige, conformity) ensure that dysfunctional signals outcompete accurate ones in the organizational meme pool. Three detailed case studies--Nokia's smartphone collapse, NASA's Challenger disaster, and Wells Fargo's account fraud scandal--illustrate the mechanism's operation across industries and failure modes. I derive five testable propositions and evaluate potential countermeasures through a mechanism design lens. The analysis reframes organizational dysfunction from moral failure to physics problem, explaining why standard interventions (culture change, leadership development, values alignment) so often fail: they treat equilibrium outcomes as behavioral problems rather than altering the selection environment that produces them.