This paper presents a novel cyber-physical attack paradigm, termed the Dual State-Space Fidelity Blade (D-STAB), which targets the firmware of core cyber-physical components as a new class of attack surfaces. The D-STAB attack exploits the information asymmetry caused by the fidelity gap between high-fidelity and low-fidelity physical models in cyber-physical systems. By designing precise adversarial constraints based on high-fidelity state-space information, the attack induces deviations in high-fidelity states that remain undetected by defenders relying on low-fidelity observations. The effectiveness of D-STAB is demonstrated through a case study in cyber-physical battery systems, specifically in an optimal charging task governed by a Battery Management System (BMS).
@article{arxiv.2507.06492,
title = {Dual State-space Fidelity Blade (D-STAB): A Novel Stealthy Cyber-physical Attack Paradigm},
author = {Jiajun Shen and Hao Tu and Fengjun Li and Morteza Hashemi and Di Wu and Huazhen Fang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.06492},
year = {2025}
}