DATE: Defense Against TEmperature Side-Channel Attacks in DVFS Enabled MPSoCs
Abstract
Given the constant rise in utilizing embedded devices in daily life, side channels remain a challenge to information flow control and security in such systems. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing elements are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In our proposed methodology, DATE: Defense Against TEmperature side-channel attacks, we propose a novel approach of reducing spatial and temporal thermal gradient, which makes the system more secure against temperature side-channel attacks, and at the same time increases the reliability of the device in terms of lifespan. In this paper, we have also introduced a new metric, Thermal-Security-in-Multi-Processors (TSMP), which is capable of quantifying the security against temperature side-channel attacks on computing systems, and DATE is evaluated to be 139.24% more secure at the most for certain applications than the state-of-the-art, while reducing thermal cycle by 67.42% at the most.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2007.01377,
title = {DATE: Defense Against TEmperature Side-Channel Attacks in DVFS Enabled MPSoCs},
author = {Somdip Dey and Amit Kumar Singh and Xiaohang Wang and Klaus Dieter McDonald-Maier},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.01377},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
13 pages, 18 figures, 3 tables