Coordination of Players in Ride-Sharing Games by Signaling
Computer Science and Game Theory
2016-04-05 v1
Abstract
Sharing unused vehicles is one practical solution for traffic congestion. We propose an advanced vehicle-sharing service that maximizes the sharing of vehicles and improves traffic efficiency by coordinating user trips via an information system. We formulate ride-sharing games that model externalities in vehicle sharing caused by insufficient vehicle supply. We show how Bayes correlated equilibrium can coordinate players in ride-sharing games and verify the resultant improvement in the price of anarchy.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1604.00706,
title = {Coordination of Players in Ride-Sharing Games by Signaling},
author = {Tatsuya Iwase and Takahiro Shiga},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.00706},
year = {2016}
}
Comments
The 30th Annual Conference of Japanese Society of Artificial Intelligence(2016)