Conventionalism in general relativity?: formal existence proofs and Reichenbach's theorem {\theta} in context
Abstract
Weatherall and Manchak (2014) show that, under reasonable assumptions, Reichenbachean universal effects, constrained to a rank-2 tensor field representation in the geodesic equation, always exist in non-relativistic gravity but not so for relativistic spacetimes. Thus general relativity is less susceptible to underdetermination than its Newtonian predecessor. D\"urr and Ben-Menahem (2022) argue these assumptions are exploitable as loopholes, effectively establishing a (rich) no-go theorem. I disambiguate between two targets of the proof, which have previously been conflated: the existence claim of at least one alternative geometry to a given one and Reichenbach's (in)famous ``theorem theta", which amounts to a universality claim that any geometry can function as an alternative to any other. I show there is no (rich) no-go theorem to save theorem theta. I illustrate this by explicitly breaking one of the assumptions and generalising the proof to torsionful spacetimes. Finally, I suggest a programmatic attitude: rather than undermining the proof one can use it to systematically and rigorously articulate stronger propositions to be proved, thereby systematically exploring the space of alternative spacetime theories.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2603.24608,
title = {Conventionalism in general relativity?: formal existence proofs and Reichenbach's theorem {\theta} in context},
author = {Ruward Mulder},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.24608},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
24 pages, 1 figure, Conventionalism, relativity, theorem theta, space of spacetimes, no-go theorems