English

Collective Schedules: Scheduling Meets Computational Social Choice

Computer Science and Game Theory 2018-03-21 v1 Multiagent Systems

Abstract

When scheduling public works or events in a shared facility one needs to accommodate preferences of a population. We formalize this problem by introducing the notion of a collective schedule. We show how to extend fundamental tools from social choice theory---positional scoring rules, the Kemeny rule and the Condorcet principle---to collective scheduling. We study the computational complexity of finding collective schedules. We also experimentally demonstrate that optimal collective schedules can be found for instances with realistic sizes.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1803.07484,
  title  = {Collective Schedules: Scheduling Meets Computational Social Choice},
  author = {Fanny Pascual and Krzysztof Rzadca and Piotr Skowron},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.07484},
  year   = {2018}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-23T00:59:02.803Z