Coercion-Resistant Voting in Linear Time via Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Towards a Quantum-Safe Scheme
Abstract
We present an approach for performing the tallying work in the coercion-resistant JCJ voting protocol, introduced by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson, in linear time using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). The suggested enhancement also paves the path towards making JCJ quantum-resistant, while leaving the underlying structure of JCJ intact. The exhaustive, comparison-based approach of JCJ using plaintext equivalence tests leads to a quadratic blow-up in the number of votes, which makes the tallying process rather impractical in realistic settings with a large number of voters. We show how the removal of invalid votes can be done in linear time via a solution based on recent advances in various FHE primitives such as hashing, zero-knowledge proofs of correct decryption, verifiable shuffles and threshold FHE. We conclude by touching upon some of the advantages and challenges of such an approach, followed by a discussion of further security and post-quantum considerations.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1901.02560,
title = {Coercion-Resistant Voting in Linear Time via Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Towards a Quantum-Safe Scheme},
author = {Peter B. Rønne and Arash Atashpendar and Kristian Gjøsteen and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.02560},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
9 pages; added acknowledgments, revised the first paragraph in the section on security remarks, revised a few sentences throughout; to appear in the proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2019, published by Springer