English

Coarse Q-learning: Indifference, Indeterminacy, and Instability

Theoretical Economics 2026-05-13 v6 Computer Science and Game Theory

Abstract

We introduce Coarse Q-learning (CQL), a reinforcement-learning model for bandit problems with stochastically varying menus. Alternatives are exogenously partitioned into similarity classes, and feedback from sampled alternatives is pooled within classes into class-level valuations. Choices follow multinomial logit over class valuations, and valuations update toward realized payoffs as in Q-learning. Using stochastic approximation, we derive the mean-field dynamics and characterize the steady states as smooth analogues of Valuation Equilibria. The model yields novel long-run phenomena in the high payoff-sensitivity limit: depending on the environment, CQL may exhibit multiple stable strict equilibria, a unique globally stable mixed equilibrium with indifference across classes, or no stable equilibrium at all, with valuations and choice probabilities converging instead to a stable limit cycle. These outcomes are driven by coarse aggregation and do not arise in the standard alternative-level benchmark.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2412.09321,
  title  = {Coarse Q-learning: Indifference, Indeterminacy, and Instability},
  author = {Philippe Jehiel and Aviman Satpathy},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.09321},
  year   = {2026}
}

Comments

45 Main pages + 26 Supplemental Appendix pages

R2 v1 2026-06-28T20:32:33.708Z